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ABSTRACT
We consider a heterogeneous network (HetNet) in which multiple
small cell base stations (SBSs) aim to offload a quantity of macro
cell user equipments (MUEs) to reduce the energy consumption of
the network while guaranteeing the QoS requirements of all UEs.
We design an ascending-bid auction mechanism to achieve this goal.
Unique and closed form solutions for the demand and supply quanti-
ties of offloading MUEs are derived. When the MBS has knowledge
about the utilities and strategies of the SBSs, the proposed auction
can be formulated as a Stackelberg game where the clinching bid
price is obtained in closed form. Numerical results verify the the-
oretical analysis for different scenarios and show that the proposed
auction clinches fast at the unique clinching price, thereby resulting
in a win-win solution that improves the energy consumption of the
HetNet.
Index Terms— ascending-bid auction, hybrid access, heteroge-
neous network, QoS requirement
1. INTRODUCTION
Heterogeneous networks (HetNets) are considered as a key
technology for 5G [1]. This paper investigates the user equipment
(UE) and base station (BS) association for a network with a single
macrocell base station (MBS) and multiple small cell base stations
(SBSs), where each UE has a rate-based QoS requirement to be
guaranteed by the serving BS.
The three basic access control mechanisms for HetNets are
closed, hybrid and open access [2, 3]. Among them, the hybrid
access is considered as the most promising for reducing the energy
consumption of the network. Since the transmit power of each UE
is highly related to the total number of UEs served in each cell, it is
important for the MBS to stimulate the SBSs for the hybrid access.
When multiple SBSs exist, auction is a powerful tool to model, ana-
lyze, and solve the problem for offloading the quantity of macrocell
UEs (MUEs) in the hybrid access.
There exist several works in which resource allocation is per-
formed using game theory and auction [4, 5]. The user-cell asso-
ciation for massive MIMO networks is considered in [6] and ad-
dressed using non-cooperative game theory. In [7], the user associa-
tion and spectrum allocation problems are addressed to stabilize the
HetNet and to minimize the transmission delay. In [8, 9], two auc-
tion mechanisms for allocating the received power among a group
of UEs subject to a constraint on the interference are proposed for
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relay selection and relay power allocation, leading to a weighted
max-min fair allocation. To motivate an efficient and fair resource
allocation for spectrum-sharing femtocell networks, Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) auction is proposed to ensure that small cell user
equipments (SUEs) submit their utilities truthfully despite of their
selfish nature [10]. The single cluster of macro-femtocell hybrid ac-
cess is discussed in [11,12] where a Stackelberg game is designed to
maximize the system energy consumption. A compensation frame-
work is proposed for motivating the hybrid access in conjunction
with a time division multiple access (TDMA) strategy [13].
In this work, the multiple SBSs are modelled as bidders that
compete among each other to offload a certain number of MUEs
and receive the corresponding compensation paid by the MBS. Two
different scenarios are envisaged. In the first one, we assume that
the MBS and SBSs belong to different operators and thus have no
knowledge of the utilities and strategies of each other. In this con-
text, a low-complexity ascending-bid auction is proposed, in which
each SBS bids for the demand quantity of the offloading MUEs only
based on their local information and the given bid price. The fast
convergence of the clinching price at market clearance is guaran-
teed. In the second scenario, we assume that the MBS and SBSs
belong to the same operator and exploit the knowledge of the utili-
ties and strategies to formulate a Stackelberg game. This allows us
to compute the clinching price in closed-form without the need of
any iterative procedure.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In order to motivate the
energy-aware hybrid access for the two-tier HetNet, an ascending-
bid auction is proposed in Sec. 2. The utilities of the MBS and
SBSs are provided as functions of the bid price and the quantity of
offloading MUEs in Sec. 3.1. Unique and closed form solutions
for the demand and supply quantities of offloading MUEs are de-
rived in Sec. 3.2 by maximizing the utilities of the MBS and SBSs,
respectively. A Stackelberg game is analyzed in Sec. 4 wherein a
closed-form clinching price is derived. Numerical results are given
in Sec. 5 to assess the performance of the proposed solutions and
validate the analysis.
2. NETWORK MODEL
2.1. System model
We consider the uplink of a two-tier HetNet in which the MBS and
SBSs operate over different frequency bands. We denote by M the
number of MUEs that are served by the MBS and assume that N
SBSs serve Li SUEs each. We assume also that all UEs and BSs
are equipped with a single antenna and that a certain QoS require-
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Fig. 1. The considered system model.
ment u must be guaranteed to each UE (no matter it is served by
the MBS or by the SBSs). Within this setting, we are interested in
reducing the energy consumption of the network. To this end, we
assume that the MBS is willing to compensate a given SBS for of-
floading a quantity of MUEs. Clearly, when N > 1 this gives rise
to a competition among the SBSs, which is modelled and solved in
this work through an ascending-bid auction mechanism as described
in the next section.
We consider a block flat-fading channel model and denote by αi
the channel gain of a generic UE i. Call Si the total number of UEs
associated to the MBS or SBS serving UE i. Then, for a given Si
the uplink power required by UE i to meet the rate requirement u is
given by [14] as
pi[Si] =
1− 2−u
αi
1
Si (2−u − 1) + 1 . (1)
We denote the Shannon rate log(1 + SINRi) as the criterion of the
rate requirement u measured in [bit/s/Hz]. When all the UEs meet
the rate requirement u with equality, pi[Si] is derived in a simple
expression as (1) where the CSI or SINR of other UEs is contained
in u.
From the above equation, it follows that a positive power alloca-
tion and the feasibility of achieving u for all UEs in the HetNet are
ensured only if the total number Si in the network is such that
0 ≤ Si ≤ 1
1− 2−u . (2)
2.2. Auction-based Hybrid Access
In a generic ascending-bid auction mechanism, the auctioneer calls
a bid price and the bidders respond with demand quantities by max-
imizing their own utilities. Meanwhile, the auctioneer optimizes the
supply at the given bid price in each round. The process iterates with
increasing bid prices until the market clears or the demand is no less
than the supply [15].
The ascending-bid auction mechanism used in this work to of-
fload MUEs operates as follows. The MBS acts as the auctioneer,
which announces a bid price b to all the SBSs (the bidders) and
calls for demand quantities {K⋆i ; i = 1, . . . , N}. Each K⋆i cor-
responds to the maximum number of MUEs that can be offloaded by
SBS i in order to maximize its own utility function USi while tak-
ing into account that the reward from the MBS is bK⋆i . At the same
time, the MBS optimizes its supply quantity by computing the opti-
mal number K⋆ of offloading MUEs by maximizing its own utility
UM . If the sum of the demand quantities is less than the supply,
i.e.,
∑N
i=1K
⋆
i < K
⋆
, then the auctioneer increases the bid price
b by a given quantity ∆b. The process continues until the market
clinches or, equivalently, until the following condition is satisfied∑N
i=1K
⋆
i = K
⋆
. The above ascending-bid auction mechanism is
summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Auction-based Hybrid Access
1: Input M , N , u, {Li}, ∆b, UM and {USi }.
2: Output K⋆, {K⋆i }, b⋆.
3: Set b = 0;
4: repeat
5: Set b = b+∆b;
6: Compute K⋆i = argmaxKi∈0,1,...,M USi ;
7: Compute K⋆ = argmaxK∈0,1,...,M UM ;
8: until
∑N
i=1K
⋆
i = K
⋆
When the auctioneer MBS has no knowledge about the utility
and strategies of the SBSs, the auction is run as shown in Algorithm
1 until the market clears.
3. AUCTION FORMULATION AND SOLUTION
Next, we introduce the utility functions of MBS and SBSs for the
propsoed auction framework and then provide its solution in a closed
form. The bid b is provided by the auctioneer MBS for the quantity
of offloading MUEs.
3.1. Auction Formulation
The utility functions UM andUSi commonly take the following form
Utility = Revenue− Cost. In this work, we assume that UM is
computed as
U
M = vM − bK, (3)
where vM denotes the Revenue for the power saving for each re-
maining MUE due to the offloading of K MUEs and bK accounts
for the total price (or cost) paid by the MBS to all SBSs. Denote M
and M−K to be the sets of MUEs served by the MBS before and
after using the hybrid access, respectively. Thereby, we obtain
v
M = λM (pi[M ]− pi[M −K]) αi1− 2−u
= λM
(
1
M(2−u − 1) + 1 −
1
(M −K)(2−u − 1) + 1
)
,
(4)
where λM denotes the equivalent revenue per unit of power saving
of a single MUE i that remains in the service range of MBS. For each
remaining MUE i in the system the term 1−2−u
αi
remains the same
for both sets M and M−K in (1). Therefore, 1−2u
αi
is multiplied
to ease the calculation. Note that both the Revenue and Cost of
the MBS are increasing functions with respect to K, i.e., the supply
quantity of offloaded MUEs.
The utility of SBS i is modelled as:
U
S
i = v
S
i + bKi − Ei (5)
where vSi accounts for the utility of the Li SUEs, bKi is the com-
pensation received from the MBS, and Ei is the cost of additional
energy of each registered SUE when additional Ki MUEs are of-
floaded to the SBS i. We let vSi = λ1Liu with λ1 being the revenue
per unit of achievable rate whereas Ei is computed as
Ei = λ2
pi[Li +Ki]
pi[Li]
= λ2
Li(2
−u − 1) + 1
(Li +Ki)(2−u − 1) + 1 (6)
with λ2 being the revenue per unit of power loss denoted by the ratio
of power consumption for a single registered SUE. Observe that Ei
is an increasing function of Ki. The utility USi is a function of only
the local information of each SBS and of the bid price b from the
MBS. Therefore, there is no need of information exchange among
SBSs.
3.2. Auction Solution
As depicted in Algorithm 1, for a given b the demand quantity of
SBS i at each iteration is obtained as the solution of the following
problem:
K
⋆
i = arg max
Ki∈{0,1,...,M}
U
S
i , (7)
where USi takes the form
U
S
i = λ1Liu+ bKi− λ2 (Li(2
−u − 1) + 1)
(Li +Ki)(2−u − 1) + 1 . (8)
The solution of the above problem can be obtained in a closed form
as follows.
Proposition 1. For a given bid price b, the solution to (7) is
K
⋆
i =
⌊
Li(2
−u − 1) + 1
1− 2−u −
√
(Li(2−u − 1) + 1)λ2
b(1− 2−u)
⌉
. (9)
Proof. K∗i in (9) is obtained by checking ∂U
S
i
∂Ki
= 0 by integer op-
timization and showing that USi is a convex function of Ki. The
optimal quantity Ki is obtained by solving the first derivative of (8)
with respect to Ki, i.e.,
∂USi
∂Ki
= b+
λ2(Li(2
−u − 1) + 1)(2−u − 1)
((Li +Ki)(2−u − 1) + 1)2 = 0,
Ki =
Li(2
−u − 1) + 1
1− 2−u −
√
(Li(2−u − 1) + 1)λ2
b(1− 2−u) .(10)
Now we show that the utility function USi in (8) admits global
maximum by checking the second derivative,
∂2USi
∂2Ki
=
−2(Li(2−u − 1) + 1)(2−u − 1)2((Li +Ki)(2−u − 1) + 1)
((Li +Ki)(2−u − 1) + 1)4 .
(11)
Given the restriction in (2), ∂2USi
∂2Ki
< 0. The integer-valued opti-
mization result is achieved by using ⌊⌉.
As seen, for a given b the computation of K⋆i requires knowl-
edge of local information as it only depends on the parameters Li,
u, and λ2, which are independent of other SBSs.
The MBS determines the optimal supply of offloading MUEs by
solving the following problem:
K
⋆ = arg max
K∈{0,1,...,M}
U
M (12)
with
U
M = λM
( 1
M(2−u − 1) + 1 −
1
(M −K)(2−u − 1) + 1
)
− bK.
Proposition 2. For a given bid price b, the solution to (12) is
K
⋆ =
⌊
M +
√
λM
b (1− 2−u) −
1
1− 2−u
⌉
. (13)
Proof. The proof follows the same procedure as that for Proposition
1 and is thus omitted for space limitations.
With the constraint on the total number of offloading MUEs
K ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M}, the bid price b should be provided in the fol-
lowing range.
Corollary 1. The rate requirement u can be ensured provided that
the bid price b is such that bmin ≤ b ≤ bmax with
bmax =
λM (1− 2−u)
(M(2−u − 1) + 1)2 , (14)
and
bmin = max
(
λ
M (1− 2−u), λ2(1− 2
−u)
Li(2−u − 1) + 1
)
. (15)
Proof. λM (1− 2−u) ≤ b ≤ λM (1−2−u)
(M(2−u−1)+1)2
is proved by ensuring
0 ≤ K ≤ M . λ2(1−2−u)
Li(2
−u−1)+1
≤ b is to ensure 0 ≤ Ki ≤ M ,
therefore Corollary 1 is proved.
4. CLINCHING PRICE-STACKELBERG GAME
If the MBS and SBSs belong to the same operator, then it is possible
for the MBS to gain knowledge about the utilities and strategies of
the SBSs. The proposed ascending-bid auction can be formulated as
a Stackelberg game. The MBS acts as the leader by providing the
clinching bid price b∗ and the SBSs act as the followers by deciding
the bid quantity of offloading MUEs given b∗.
We now proceed computing the clinching bid price in a closed
form. If the MBS acquires the information of the SBSs, then it can
predict the bid b∗ without iterations. As described before, the auction
mechanism is clinched if the market clears or, equivalently, if the
supply is equal to the total demand, which amounts to saying that
K⋆ =
∑N
i=1K
⋆
i . Then, from the results of Propositions 1 and 2 it
follows that:
Proposition 3. The clinching bid price b∗ can be obtained from the
following equation
b
∗=

 √λM +∑Ni=1√λ2(Li(2−u − 1) + 1)√
1
1−2−u
(1+
∑N
i=1 Li(2
−u − 1) + 1)−M√1− 2−u

2.
0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.3 0.32
0
1
2
3
4
5
Bidding price b
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
p
ti
m
a
l
M
U
E
s
M =5, L1 =2, L2 =1 u =0.18 λ
M =1 λ1 =5 λ2 =1
 
 
K∗1
K∗2
K∗1 +K
∗
2
K∗
Clinching
Fig. 2. Illustration of clinching bid price at market clearance with
u = 0.18.
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Fig. 3. Illustration of clinching bid price at market clearance with
u = 0.3.
Proof. Imposing K⋆ = ∑N
i=1K
⋆
i and solving with respect to b
yields the above result (after simple calculus).
If the MBS and SBSs belong to different operators, then the
ascending-bid auction is run as shown in Algorithm 1. This is il-
lustrated in the next section.
5. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In order to illustrate the outcome of the proposed auction-based hy-
brid access, the scenario where two small cells exist within the cov-
erage of the macrocell is simulated. However, the results are extend-
able to multiple small cells.
In the following, the identical rate requirement is set in the range
such that it is achievable for all possible numbers of UEs in the two-
tier system no matter in the macrocell or the small cell.
We illustrate when the MBS has no knowledge about the SBSs,
how the number of MUEs in both demand and supply changes with
the bid price for different network parameters. In each round of the
auction, both the auctioneer MBS and the bidders SBSs optimize
their supply and demand quantities of offloading MUEs by maxi-
mizing their own utilities, respectively. UM is a decreasing function
whileUFi is an increasing function of b. The higher the bid price, the
more compensation the MBS will pay to the SBSs and thus the lower
its supply of MUEs. In contrast, the higher b, the more MUEs the
SBSs are willing to serve. There exists a unique clinching price b∗
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Fig. 4. Illustration of clinching bid price at market clearance with
λ2 = 2.
such that the market clears with K∗ =
∑N
i=1K
∗
i . And the step size
∆b can be chosen for fast convergence. We can see from the figures
that the bid price clinches only after few iterations, which shows the
fast convergence of Algorithm 1.
By comparing Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we observe that when the
rate requirement u of each UE increases, the clinching bid price b∗
is higher and the market clearance quantity K∗ decreases. This is
because the higher rate requirement, the less the acceptable number
of UEs in each cell. Moreover, the SBSs need more compensation
from the MBS in order to stimulate the acceptance of the additional
MUEs.
When λ2 increases as shown in Fig. 4, the clinching bid price b∗
also becomes higher and the market clearance quantityK∗ decreases
as well. The reason is that λ2 shows the importance of the energy
loss for the SBSs when concerning to serve additional MUEs. If
λ2 becomes higher, then less K∗i MUEs could be served in order
to make sure that the loss in power of the registered SUEs is not
significant.
The theoretical analysis of b∗, K∗1 , K∗2 and K∗ are verified by
the simulation results. Both the utilities of the MBS and SBSs are
maximized. Since there is no overhead on information exchange
among different cells, the proposed ascending-bid auction is a low-
complexity mechanism to apply for the hybrid access in HetNets.
After optimizing the offloading quantity of MUEs, the MBS can
decide the exact MUEs with the shortest distance to the correspond-
ing SBS in order to minimize the total energy consumption of the
two-tier HetNet. However, this is beyond the scope of the current
work. Therefore, the comparison of energy reduction remains in our
future work.
6. CONCLUSION
In order to motivate the energy-aware hybrid access in the two-tier
macro-small cell network, a novel ascending-bid auction-based al-
gorithm is proposed.. The MBS in the macro- cell acts as the auc-
tioneer and the SBSs in the small cells act as the bidders. The bid
price is provided by the MBS to all the SBSs. The optimal supply
and demand quantities and the clinching price are derived in closed
form solutions. Numerical results illustrate that the auction clinches
at the unique clinching price and the utilities of both the MBS and
the SBSs are maximized, showing that the auction algorithm results
in a win-win solution.
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